Prof. Yaniv Grinstein is a Full Professor of Finance at the Arison School of Business and an Adjunct Professor of Finance at Cornell University Johnson School of Management. His research focuses on financial decisions in corporations and on the effect of corporate governance on corporate decisions and firm value. Prof. Grinstein has published in leading journals such as Journal of Finance, Journal of Financial Economics, Management Science, Review of Finance and others. He is an editor at Corporate Governance: an International Review (starting January 2019), an associate editor at the Financial Review, and is a member of the European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI). His scientific work has been covered in the New York Times, the Wall Street Journal,Forbes, as well as in Congress hearings. Before Joining IDC, Professor Grinstein was a tenured Associate Professor at Cornell University. Between 2006-2007 he served as a visiting scholar at the Security and Exchange Commission. At IDC Prof. Grinstein serves as a co-head of the Master program in Financial Economics and as the head of the Finance group.
De Angelis, D., Grinstein, Y., 2019, Relative Performance Evaluation in CEO Compensation: a Talent Retention Explanation, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Forthcoming.
Allen F., Carletti, and Grinstein, Y., 2018, International Evidence on Firm Level Decisions in Response to the Crisis: Shareholders vs. Other Stakeholders, Journal of the Japanese and International Economies 47, 3-16.
Grinstein, Y., Weinbaum, D., Yehuda, N., 2017. The Economic Consequences of Perk Disclosure. Contemporary Accounting Research 34, 1812-1842.
Chhaochharia, V., Grinstein, Y., Grullon, G., Michaely, R., 2017, Product Market Competition and Internal Governance: Evidence from the Sarbanes Oxley Act. Management Science 63, 1405-1424.
Grinstein, Y., Rossi, S., 2016, Good Monitoring, Bad Monitoring. Review of Finance 20, 1719-1768.
De Angelis, D., Grinstein, Y., 2015, Performance Terms in CEO Compensation Contracts, Review of Finance 19, 619-651.
Cremers, M., Grinstein, Y., 2014, Does the Market for CEO Talent Explain CEO Controversial Pay Practices? Review of Finance 18, 921-960.
Bebchuk, L., Grinstein, Y., Peyer, U., 2010, Lucky CEOs and Lucky Directors, Journal of Finance 65, 2363-2401.
Chhaochharia, V., Grinstein, Y., 2009, CEO Compensation and Board Structure, Journal of Finance 64, 231-261.
Chhaochharia, V., Grinstein, Y., 2007, Corporate Governance and Firm Value: The Impact of the 2002 Governance Rules, Journal of Finance 62, 1789-1825.
Chhaochharia, V., Grinstein, Y., 2007, The Changing Structure of US Corporate Boards: 1997-2003, Corporate Governance: An International Review 15, 1215-1223.
Grinstein, Y., 2006, The Disciplinary Role of Debt and Equity Contracts: Theory and Tests, Journal of Financial Intermediation 15, 419-443.
Grinstein, Y., Michaely, R., 2005, Institutional Holdings and Payout Policy, Journal of Finance 60, 1389-1426.
Bebchuk, L., Grinstein, Y., 2005, The Growth of Executive Pay, Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 21, 283-303.
Grinstein, Y., 2004, Complementary Perspectives on Efficient Capital Markets, Corporate Disclosure and Enron, Cornell Law Review, 89, 503-510.
Grinstein, Y., Hribar, P., 2004, CEO Compensation and Incentives: Evidence from M&A Bonuses, Journal of Financial Economics 73, 119-143.